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Although at first he only felt weak, Juan Davila was rushed to the emergency room to 
find severe internal bleeding that nearly took his life. With seven units of blood, five days in 
critical care, and a subsequent hospital stay, he barely cheated death, but not unscathed. Against 
his primary physician’s medical recommendation that he treat his severe rheumatoid arthritis 
pain with Vioxx, a gentler medication absorbed through the stomach, Aetna (his HMO) refused 
to cover Vioxx and would only cover a less expensive pain killer, Naproxen. With neither the 
time nor the means to appeal Aetna’s decision, Davila went ahead with the covered treatment. As 
a result of his HMO’s poor medical necessity decision, Davila barely escaped imminent death, 
leaving him in a state where he can no longer take any oral medication, including Vioxx.1   
Sadly enough, Juan Davila is just one tragic example of many working Americans whose 
medical treatment is effectively subject to the whim of the godlike HMOs that dominate today’s 
health care industry. What is almost equally tragic is that legally the courts’ hands are tied. 
Under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act [hereinafter ERISA], the courts 
cannot provide compensatory, or make-whole, relief for victims like Juan Davila. Or so the 
courts have interpreted ERISA historically.2  
In reality, the U.S. Supreme Court has inadvertently painted itself into a corner by 
interpreting ERISA in a manner that is incompatible with employer-based HMO plans. 
Originally, Congress intended ERISA to provide uniformity in administration of employee 
benefit plans. Thus, to preserve uniformity, ERISA expressly provides that any claims related to 
                                                 
1 Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, Brief for Respondents, 2004 WL 177030 (U.S.). 
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2005). Courts and other sources often use both the term “make-whole” relief and 
“compensatory” relief interchangeably. Make-whole relief is often in the form of monetary compensatory damages. 
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an employer plan under state laws are preempted by ERISA. However, at the time of its creation, 
employer-based HMOs were hardly known. And, because ERISA was created before the rise of 
HMOs, Congress could not anticipate the extent ERISA would affect HMO liability. In specific, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, under Justice Scalia, has interpreted the statutory language to indicate 
that Congress intended to only provide traditional equitable relief for claims brought against 
ERISA plans. What this means, in part, is that those injured due to delay or denial of benefit 
coverage do not receive compensatory relief. In effect, the law initially enacted to protect plan 
participants is thus turned against them in the HMO context. 
Finally, Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion of the recent Aetna Health, Inc. v. 
Davila decision, referred to the Government’s amicus brief, in which it mentioned a specific 
uncharted area of the law that may potentially provide monetary relief to ERISA plan members.3 
She pointed out that the Supreme Court had not yet precluded “make-whole” relief under a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim.4 In other words, this is one area that had not yet been specifically 
tested against ERISA. Justice Scalia and his followers interpret ERISA’s remedial scheme to 
protect only ERISA plans and preclude individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty. And, it 
would seem that Justice Scalia has set into motion a strict literalist trend among most courts in 
ERISA interpretation. However, mounted on his white horse, Justice Stevens and his followers 
have countered with a more employee-friendly alternative approach, based on common law trust 
principles that would award individual compensatory relief under ERISA for breaches of 
fiduciary duty. Indeed, when this issue of ERISA damages for HMO breach of fiduciary duty 
finally makes it before the Supreme Court, which side will prevail is difficult to predict. 
One may question if perhaps this is the long-awaited claim for relief—the light at the end 
                                                 
3 Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, Brief for the United States, 2003 WL 23011479 (U.S.). 
4 Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring). 
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of the tunnel—that will finally survive under ERISA. That depends on a delicate balance that 
exists among the Supreme Court justices. How that balance may impact the compatibility of the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, in the HMO context, with ERISA is the theme of this paper. The 
first section provides a background of ERISA and its application in HMO liability. The next 
section discusses the significant case history, in which Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens clashed 
on this issue. The third section outlines the views of the Scalia camp and the Stevens camp. 
Finally, the last section explores the potential viability in the courts of Justice Ginsburg’s 
fiduciary “loophole” to HMOs’ protective ERISA shield, particularly in light of the two 
opposing approaches of the Court toward ERISA remedies. 
II. ERISA BACKGROUND 
ERISA first made its way into congressional limelight upon the closing of the Studebaker 
South Bend, Indiana factory; the company defaulted on pension payments because its pension 
plan was not adequately funded to compensate all of its vested pension obligations.5 This case 
catalyzed long-awaited Congressional action in pension reform.6  
In all too many cases the pension promise shrinks to this: “If you remain in good 
health and stay with the same company until you are 65 years old, and if the 
company is still in business, and if your department has not been abolished, and if 
you haven't been laid off for too long a period, and if there is enough money in 
the fund, and if that money has been prudently managed, you will get a pension.7  
 
United Auto Workers (UAW) proposed legislation to protect employee benefits from default risk 
by creating a pension reinsurance.8 This marked the beginning of a series of employee benefit 
                                                 
5 James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and 
the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001). 
6 Id. at 684. 
7 Pension & Welfare Plans: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Labor, Committee on Labor & Public Welfare, 
United States Senate, July 25, 1968, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1968) (testimony of Asst. Sec. Thomas R. Donahue).  
8 Wooten, supra note 5, at 684.  
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reforms that comprise ERISA, enacted in 1974.9  
 Congress wanted to create a comprehensive scheme to regulate employee benefit plans—
both pension plans and welfare plans.10 ERISA was intended to provide uniform regulation of 
employee benefit plans11 and to “protect the interests of plan participants . . . by providing 
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”12 ERISA’s provisions 
ensure, in general:13 (1) adequate funding of pension plans, (2) vesting of benefits for plan 
participants, and (3) fiduciary obligations for plan administrators, arguably based in trust law, as 
will be explained later.14  
 Because ERISA is a lengthy statute, the following sections will explore only those 
portions that seem most relevant to the issue of individual monetary relief for breach of fiduciary 
duty, after a brief overview of HMOs and how they relate to ERISA. 
1. HMO BACKGROUND IN ERISA CONTEXT 
Since the time of ERISA’s enactment, the health care industry has changed dramatically. 
Managed care systems (HMOs) did not exist then as we know them as today—massive giants 
that dominate the industry. At that time, in a fee-for-service program, physicians billed insurers 
after treating patients, whereupon insurers made retrospective coverage decisions. If insurers 
denied coverage for treatments, patients could seek benefits due under ERISA §502(a).15 In this 
age, however, managed care employee benefit plans are now quite prevalent among the 
                                                 
9 Id.  
10 See generally DiFelice v. AETNA U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d Cir. 2003).  
11 Davila, 542 U.S. at 208 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985)). 
12 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2005). 
13 Pamela D. Perdue, Overview of ERISA’s Legislative and Regulatory Scheme, SJ068 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 5 (Feb. 26–
28, 2004). 
14 See Davila, 542 U.S. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (citing John H. Langbein, What ERISA 
Means by “Equitable”: the Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Martens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1317, 1319 (2003)). 
15 DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 464.  
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American workforce—three of four workers have such a plan.16 In contrast to the fee-for-service 
practice in the past, HMOs now determine treatment coverage prospectively—based on a 
utilization review board’s determination of medical necessity—before any treatment takes place 
as a cost-saving measure.17  
Unfortunately, a wrongful delay or denial in coverage can cause injurious, even tragic, 
consequences. In reality, the HMO’s coverage decision in a medical emergency “de facto 
determines a patient’s actual treatment along with his eligibility for benefits, . . .”18 With the 
time and inconvenience to appeal coverage denial, most patients under urgent circumstances do 
not attempt to appeal the denial of coverage. Instead, they opt, in haste, to pay out of pocket, 
forego the treatment, or use a less expensive treatment.19 As will be discussed later, ERISA does 
not permit compensatory damages, according to the Supreme Court—a tragedy for the plan 
participant who becomes injured from the HMO’s negligence.20  
In the context of ERISA, HMOs should owe a fiduciary duty to the plan participants. One 
of the primary purposes behind ERISA is to enforce the fiduciary duties of plan administrators.21 
The Court in Davila explained that a fiduciary under ERISA is any person “to the extent . . . he 
has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of [an 
employee benefit] plan.”22 Therefore, HMOs are generally regarded as plan fiduciaries when 
they use their discretion, as part of their plan administrative duties, to make eligibility decisions 
for plan benefits, though that line is not always clear.23 Once the court determines that an HMO 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).  
21 See Davila, 542 U.S. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Langbein, supra note 14, at 
1319)). 
22 Id. at 2501–02 (citing ERISA § 3(21)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii)). 
23 Id. 
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is acting as a fiduciary, the issue then lies primarily in the relief available under ERISA for an 
HMO’s breach of fiduciary duty. 
Most claims against HMOs are typically brought under state law claims to avoid 
ERISA’s strict remedial scheme. As a result, Congress included a preemption provision in order 
to maintain uniformity in regulation of employee benefit plans.24 Since most claims for recovery 
or improper management of plan benefits are made under various state causes of action, 
Congress provided the preemption mechanism whereby ERISA supersedes any state laws that 
relates to employee benefit plans.25  
2. § 502(a)(1)(B) Civil Enforcement Provisions  
In terms of HMO liability, the remedies provided in the ERISA Civil Enforcement 
Provisions, contained in § 502, are the culprit behind most of the debate. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) 
provides that a plan participant or beneficiary may bring civil action “to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”26 Additionally, § 502(a)(2) allows the plan 
participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries to bring civil action “for appropriate relief under [§ 409] 
of this title.”27 And, § 502(a)(3) allows them to bring a civil action “(A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain 
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of 
                                                 
24 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), 1144 (2005).  
25 Alden J. Bianchi, ERISA and Health Plans: Selected Court Decisions – Focus on ERISA Preemption Kentucky 
Association of Health Plans v. Miller, Davila v. AETNA, Hawaii Management Alliance Association v. Insurance 
Commissioner, SK064 ALI-ABA 1035, 1042 Feb. 17–19, 2005. 
26 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B) (2005).  
27 “Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or 
duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to 
the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been 
made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief 
as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.” 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
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this subchapter or the terms of the plan.”28  
The central debate stems from the judicial interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” 
in §502(a)(3). The Supreme Court, under Justice Scalia, feared that the phrase could potentially 
cover all types of relief, “render[ing] the modifier [‘equitable’] superfluous.”29 Therefore, the 
Court limited the scope of that relief in the landmark Mertens decision to “those categories of 
relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but 
not compensatory damages).”30  
3. § 502(a) Exclusive list of remedies - Pilot 
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, Justice Scalia has made it clear that ERISA was intended to 
provide a “comprehensive civil enforcement scheme.”31 In other words, plaintiffs are limited to 
the remedies expressly provided for in the “plain” language of ERISA itself. Indeed, according to 
the Court in Pilot Life, plan participants would “undermine” the policy reasons Congress adopted 
in order to carefully select the provisions contained in §502(a), such as uniformity in plan 
administration, if they “were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in 
ERISA.”32 Thus, “any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the 
ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the 
ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.”33 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s narrow 
scope of remedies, combined with ERISA’s preemption clause, has left most injured ERISA plan 
participants empty-handed in what has been termed a “regulatory vacuum.”  
4. Regulatory Vacuum 
                                                 
28 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 
29 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–57.  
30 Id. at 256. 
31 Id. at 251; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). 
32 Pilot, 481 U.S. at 54.  
33 Davila 542 U.S. at 222 (ERISA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides 'strong evidence 
that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.' " Pilot, 481 
U.S. at 54 (quoting Mass. Mutual Life Insur. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146–47 (1985). 
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In essence, the Court’s interpretation of ERISA has created is a “regulatory vacuum.” 
ERISA’s broad preemptive power strips the plaintiff of state remedies. But, ERISA’s 
“comprehensive and reticulated scheme” fails to replace them with federal remedies that are of 
much use to a plaintiff physically injured due to delay or denial of medical treatment coverage.34 
The Court has made abundantly clear that there is no compensatory relief available under ERISA 
for consequential injury.35 If the most an HMO would have to provide as an ERISA remedy 
would be an injunction or the cost of the denied treatment, it stands to reason that an HMO 
would seek preemption.36 In most cases, unless the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction or 
reimbursement for denied treatment he or she has already paid for out of pocket, the plaintiff is 
simply out of luck, while the HMO is let off the hook.37 Under ERISA’s liability shield, there 
seems little to stop HMOs from unbridled harm to ERISA plan members.38  
Thus, perhaps the Court, in its strict formalist approach for consistency, has lost sight of 
ERISA’s mission to protect the interests of plan participants. Indeed, the Court indicated that the 
drafters of that provision “were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and 
with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of the individual 
beneficiary.”39  
Furthermore, ERISA participants’ desperate attempts to circumvent ERISA’s remedial 
                                                 
34 See Davila 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring). 
35 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.  
36 See 29 U.S.C. §1132 (2005).  
37 Davila 542 U.S. at 211.  
38 See DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453–54 (“However, with the rise of managed care and the Supreme Court's series of 
decisions holding preempted any action for damages against HMOs, ERISA has evolved into a shield that insulates 
HMOs from liability for even the most egregious acts of dereliction committed against plan beneficiaries, a state of 
affairs that I view as directly contrary to the intent of Congress. Indeed, existing ERISA jurisprudence creates a 
monetary incentive for HMOs to mistreat those beneficiaries, who are often in the throes of medical crises and 
entirely unable to assert what meager rights they possess.”).  
39Russell, 473 U.S. at 142. 
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scheme have met with little success in the courts.40 Those claims that do squeak by tend to be the 
exception, rather than the rule.41 Instead of trying to get around ERISA preemption, Justice 
Ginsburg offered a unique approach to this dilemma, suggesting “if you can’t beat ERISA, join 
it.” In her concurrence of the recent Davila decision, she proposed the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim as a potential source of relief available under ERISA’s § 502(a)(3) “other appropriate 
equitable relief” provision. Though the Court has not yet ruled on that exact issue in the HMO 
context, this next section introduces a series of cases that illustrate the tug-of-war within the 
Court for the “appropriate” scope of ERISA § 502(a)(3). 
III. “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF” REVEALED 
Beginning with Russell in 1985, a sharp division arose in the Court as to the scope of 
“equitable” relief available to individual ERISA plan beneficiaries. The plaintiff in Russell 
sought compensation for her disability plan’s wrongful denial of benefits.42 Justice Stevens’s 
Russell decision ruled against individual relief under § 409(a) and § 502(a)(2), which allowed 
relief only to the plan for breach of fiduciary duty.43 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia read this to 
extend to § 502(a)(3) relief, as well, in his decision in Mertens and Great-West.44 What is more, 
Justice Stevens read ERISA to be so “comprehensive and reticulated” that the Court is precluded 
from inferring remedies that are not there because, according to Stevens, Congress had actually 
intended to omit them.45 It was this opinion that seemed to spark Justice Scalia’s restrictive 
Mertens opinion. 
 The Russell concurrence by Justice Brennan was quick to catch Justice Stevens’s 
                                                 
40 See, supra nn.6–10, and accompanying text.  
41 Id.  
42 Russell, 473 U.S. at 136–37. 
43 Id. at 144, 145. 
44 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254; Great-West Life v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002). 
45 Russell, 473 U.S. at 146. 
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misstatement. Instead of a comprehensive statute, the legislative history demonstrated that 
ERISA was intended to provide a general skeletal scheme to be further developed by case law.46 
This will be highlighted in greater detail in section IV of this paper.  
Gleaning from Justice Stevens’s dicta in Russell, Justice Scalia’s Mertens opinion in 
1993 took an awkwardly narrow approach of “equitable” relief. In this case, the plaintiff was 
unable to recover all of his accrued benefits from either his insolvent employer or the ERISA 
plan’s termination insurance program.47 The plaintiff sought compensatory damages against an 
actuarial firm for its involvement with the plan accounts and failure to reveal their 
underfunding.48 Because ERISA was intended to be an all-inclusive legal package, according to 
Russell, then “equitable” relief in § 502(a)(3) against a non-fiduciary must not include outside 
trust law, which the Court considered over-inclusive. The Court reasoned that “ ‘[e]quitable’ 
relief must mean something less than all relief.”49 Instead, it must only refer to those remedies 
“typically available” in equity from the days of the divided bench.50 Those remedies included 
injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but expressly excluded compensatory damages.51 
In a surprising about face of loyalty from the strict formalist Scalia camp to the more 
functionalist side, Justice Stevens switched from his majority opinion in Russell against 
individual compensatory relief under § 502(a)(2), to the dissent in Mertens, favoring individual 
compensatory relief under §502(a)(3).52 He, along with Justices White, O’Connor, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, joined Justice White’s dissent. Here, the dissent argued that monetary 
                                                 
46 See Russell, 473 U.S. at 152–53 n.6, 155, 156–57 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also, infra n.183, and 
accompanying text. 
47 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 259, n.8. 
50 Id. at 256–57. 
51 Id. 
52 Russell, 473 U.S. 134; Mertens, 208 U.S. at 263 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and O’Connor, 
JJ., dissenting).  
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compensatory damages to “make the victims of the breach whole” are an acceptable form of 
equitable relief traditionally awarded in trust common law.53 Thus, the majority under Justice 
Scalia was mistaken in precluding all forms of compensatory damages. 
Just when it seemed there was no hope for any kind of practicable relief for injured 
individual ERISA plan participants, along came the Varity decision in 1996, in which the 
Supreme Court functionalist camp finally prevailed, throwing out a life saver to those 
plaintiffs.54 In this case, the plan fiduciaries purposefully misled the employees under the plan.55 
The Court distinguished Russell, holding that, even though individual relief for breach of 
fiduciary duty is not available under § 409(a) and § 502(a)(2), it is available under § 502(a)(3).56 
According to the majority, there was no reason why Congress would have denied relief under 
those circumstances.57 
Naturally, the formalist camp contended this result. Justice Thomas’s lengthy dissent 
reiterated a strict, confined statutory construction—arguing in true formalist style against any 
remedy not expressly included in the statute.58 It maintained that Russell should also apply to § 
502(a)(3), especially since ERISA was not intended to follow the trust common law definition of 
fiduciary duty to protect plan participants, but to protect the integrity of the plan itself.59 In short, 
there should be no recovery for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 502(a)(3). 
Lastly, in 2002, the pendulum swung back in favor of the formalist side in Great-West, 
where Justice Scalia basically supported its earlier Mertens decision. An ERISA plan was the 
plaintiff in this case, seeking subrogation from the participant, who had recovered damages from 
                                                 
53 Mertens, 208 U.S. at 266–67 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).  
54 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
55 Id. at 494. 
56 Id. at 515. 
57 Id. at 513. 
58 Id. at 516–22. 
59 Id. at 522–25. 
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a third party tortfeasor, for benefits it had paid.60 Again, the majority under Justice Scalia 
reiterated the same argument used in Mertens for a narrow scope of “appropriate equitable 
relief”—those “typically available in equity”—due to the comprehensive nature of ERISA’s 
construction.61 The Court ruled that a plan participant may not hold the defendant personally 
liable for restitution in equity, but only recover particular identifiable funds in the defendant’s 
possession.62 In other words, the plaintiff can only claim that which can be identified as 
belonging to him or her.63 However, the Court held against recovery for the ERISA plan because 
the settlement funds were not in the defendant’s possession.64  
Then Justice Ginsburg led the pack in dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer. First, she blasted the majority for relying on an unjustifiable definition of “equitable” 
relief that, not only has been abandoned since the 1930s, but also contradicts “Congress’ stated 
goals in enacting ERISA.”65 Instead, she supported the flexible definition, based in trust law, 
adaptable for each case to provide the “appropriate equitable relief.”66 
Also, it is worth noting some critical flaws, pointed out by Professor John H. Langbein, a 
notable author, in Justice Scalia’s position in Great-West on restitution as it applies to § 
502(a)(3). First, Scalia had to amend his views of restitution as an appropriate form of relief in 
order to maintain his position against monetary damages.67 Accordingly, he distinguished 
restitution in law and in equity. The plaintiff could not impose personal liability on the 
defendant, as such would constitute restitution in law.68 Yet, had he paid more attention to the 
                                                 
60 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208. 
61 Id. at 209–10. 
62 Id. at 214. 
63 Id. at 213. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 225–28 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
67 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1357. 
68 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214. 
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same text he relied on to revive the antiquated definition of equity in Mertens, he would find that 
the plan, as the “equitable assignee” in subrogation cases, should have a right to restitution of 
repaid funds in equity.69 Another significant problem lies in the fact that neither restitution nor 
mandamus existed in equity before the divided bench, only quasi-contract and constructive 
trusts.70 This brings into question of the validity of his Mertens opinion that originally included 
restitution as a form of relief “typically available in equity.”71 Also, Justice Scalia’s inflexible 
interpretation would permit plan beneficiaries, such as the defendant in this case, to use ERISA 
as an “instrument of fraud” against their plan.72 These are some serious flaws that seem to call 
Justice Scalia’s whole logic into question. 
Of course, Justice Stevens also had to add his own two cents against this decision. He 
pointed out that Mertens applied only to § 502(a)(3)(B) for “other appropriate equitable relief,” 
not to the instant case seeking injunction under § 502(a)(3)(A).73 Essentially, he saw no reason 
why Congress would create a cause of action and not provide a remedy for plan participants.74 
Thus, it stands to reason that the majority had no basis for insisting that Congress intended to 
preclude compensatory remedies to plan participants, other than their historical analysis of an 
obsolete court system.75 
Thus we see from the Court’s complicated history, the future of individual compensatory 
relief for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3) is nearly impossible to predict. On the one 
end of the tug-of-war is Scalia’s formalist camp, insisting on a limited interpretation of § 
502(a)(3) that leaves most injured ERISA plan participants without compensatory relief. On the 
                                                 
69 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1358. 
70 Id. at 1357. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1358. 
73 Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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other end is Steven’s functionalist camp, relying on common law trust principles to provide a 
broader make-whole standard for compensatory relief under § 502(a)(3). The replacement of two 
swing voters on this issue—former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor—could 
potentially tip the scales in either direction. 
A. PEGRAM: DAVILA PRECURSOR 
Pegram v. Herdrich was a noteworthy precursor in 2000 that helped set the stage for the 
Davila decision.76 Like Davila, this case concerned HMO liability in the treatment of its 
employee plan participants. The HMO in this case, Carle Care, was owned by physicians that 
provided prepaid medical care under employer contracts.77 Petitioner physician required 
respondent to wait eight days to have an ultrasound of her abdomen.78 It was during this delay 
that her appendix burst, resulting in peritonitis.79  
The Supreme Court considered whether treatment decisions made by HMO physician 
employees of an ERISA-regulated plan constituted fiduciary acts, and, therefore, the claims 
would be preempted by ERISA.80 The “threshold question” for ERISA breach of fiduciary duty 
is “not whether the actions of some person employed to provide services under a plan adversely 
affected a plan beneficiary's interest, but whether that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, 
was performing a fiduciary function) when taking the action subject to complaint.”81 In other 
words, an ERISA plan administrator may wear many hats, but he or she must wear only one hat 
at a time, meaning he or she is a fiduciary for the purposes of ERISA when he or she acts in that 
capacity.82 Indeed, to argue otherwise would put the cart before the horse.  
                                                 
76 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
77 Id. at 215. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 214  
81 Id. at 226. 
82 Id. 
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The Court distinguished this case where Carle’s physicians made mixed treatment and 
eligibility decisions from pure eligibility decisions.83 According to the Court, pure eligibility 
decisions were strictly administrative actions—clearly part of ERISA fiduciary duty.84 However, 
mixed treatment and eligibility decisions were not fiduciary decisions.85  
Indeed, the Court believed that to allow ERISA preemption of mixed eligibility decisions 
would erode the distinction between state malpractice and federal ERISA actions.86 Such an 
allowance would render any medical malpractice claims of HMO physicians in state court 
superfluous, clogging the federal courts with litigation.87 In reality, federal judges would have to 
integrate medical malpractice standards into ERISA fiduciary cases if mixed decisions were 
considered fiduciary acts.88 Obviously, the Court explained, Congress did not intend ERISA to 
have such far-reaching ramifications.89 Therefore, the Court unanimously concluded that mixed 
decisions were not fiduciary actions.90 Because the physician’s decision in this case did not 
constitute a fiduciary act, there was no need to determine whether there had been a breach of 
fiduciary duty and, more importantly, no need to completely preempt the claim, either.91  
 Finally, in 2004, the Davila case presented the Court with claims for breaches of 
fiduciary duty against HMOs. 
B. DAVILA  
In Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to combine two ERISA 
                                                 
83 Id. at 228–29.  
84 See id. 
85 Id. at 229. 
86 DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 450 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235–36).  
87 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235.  
88 Id. at 236.  
89 Id. at 237.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
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preemption cases.92 In one case, described at the beginning of this paper, Aetna’s denial of 
coverage for Vioxx pain medication compelled Juan Davila to resort to a less expensive pain 
medication that Aetna would cover—a decision that led to severe intestinal bleeding and 
damage.93 The other respondent, Ruby Calad, suffered complications when CIGNA cut her post-
surgery hospital stay short—a decision which resulted in rehospitalization.94 Both sets of 
respondents alleged in state court that denial of coverage for recommended treatment constituted 
a breach of ordinary care in making treatment decisions under the Texas Health Care Liability 
Act (THCLA) and was the proximate cause of their injuries.95  
Reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held that ERISA completely 
preempts the THCLA claim for breach of ordinary care.96 Since the respondents’ claims were in 
regard to merely the administration of their benefits, that is, coverage denial, then their claims 
fell within the scope of ERISA §502(a)(1)(B) fiduciary duties.97 Moreover, the Court reasoned it 
would undermine Congressional intent that §502(a)(1)(B) causes of action remain exclusive if it 
permitted state law to supplement ERISA §502(a) remedies.98  
Relying on the Court’s reasoning in Pegram,99 respondents contended that their cases 
should not be preempted since they did not relate to employee benefits.100 The Court 
distinguished its holding in Pegram from the instant cases. It limited Pegram to mixed eligibility 
cases where the treating physician also made benefit administration decisions—that is, where the 
                                                 
92 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
93 Id. at 205.  
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 214.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 216. 
99 530 U.S. 211. 
100 Davila 542 U.S. at 218.  
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plan coverage “eligibility decision and the treatment decision were inextricably mixed.”101 In 
contrast, the plan administrators in these instant cases were “neither respondents’ treating 
physicians nor the employers of respondents’ treating physicians.”102 Furthermore, the 
respondents only claimed recovery for denial of benefits—a pure eligibility decision.103 
Therefore, since pure eligibility decisions are fiduciary acts under Pegram,104 these cases fall 
under ERISA fiduciary regulation105 and should be completely preempted.106 
The Court mentioned the United States’ suggestion that §502(a)(3) could potentially 
provide “make-whole” relief to the respondents.107 However, because respondents failed to 
amend their pleadings to include §502(a), the Court did not address the issue concerning the 
scope of §502(a) or the remedies thereby available.108 Accordingly, the cases were remanded for 
further proceedings, but, unfortunately, the parties did not pursue the case further.109  
Justice Ginsburg, in her sympathetic concurrence, encouraged Congress and the Court to 
correct ERISA’s “regulatory vacuum,” which generally leaves plan participants without relief.110 
In light of that, she elaborated more on “make-whole” relief the Court mentioned might be 
available under ERISA111—a potential loophole to the seemingly hopeless “regulatory 
vacuum.”112 More specifically, the United States pointed out in its amicus brief that, although the 
Court has precluded recovery against a non-fiduciary for injuries, there may still be make-whole 
                                                 
101 Id. (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235).  
102 Id. at 221.  
103 Id.  
104 530 U.S. at 228–29. 
105 Davila, 542 U.S. at 218. 
106 Id. at 220. The Court also held that these state claims are not saved from preemption if the state law regulating 
insurance generally duplicates or supplements ERISA §502(a) because of the overpowering comprehensiveness 
intended with § 502(a). Id. at 216. 
107 Id. at 221, n.7.  
108 Scott Rhodes, Note, ERISA Strikes Back: AETNA Health, Inc. v. Davila’s Use of ERISA to Strike Down the 
Texas Health Care Liability Act, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 481, 499 (2005) (citing Davila, 542 U.S. at 221, n.7). 
109 Calad v. CIGNA Healthcare of Texas, Inc., 388 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2004).  
110 Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring).  
111 Id. at 221 n.7.  
112 Id. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring).  
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compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary duty, since such equitable relief existed “at the time 
of the divided bench.”113 This loophole will be the topic of discussion for the rest of this paper.  
IV. SCALIA V. STEVENS: TEXT OR PURPOSE 
The aforementioned series of cases illustrates the sharp division within the Court over the 
scope of § 502(a)(3) relief, which makes it difficult to predict what may happen when the Court 
is finally faced with a case where a plan participant specifically claims § 502(a)(3) relief against 
an HMO. Claiming to use a strict textual approach, Justice Scalia’s camp supports a narrow 
interpretation of “equitable relief” only for the plan itself. On the other side, Justice Stevens’s 
camp applies trust common law principles to award a broader range of make-whole 
compensatory damages to individuals, as well as the plan. But with the past dynamics in the 
delicate balance that exists among the Supreme Court and the recent turnover in justices, this 
tug-of-war could go either way. 
At present, the Supreme Court has not yet precluded compensatory damages against an 
ERISA fiduciary. The plaintiffs in the Varity case, which was decided in between Mertens and 
Great-West, were awarded equitable relief against a fiduciary—in the form of reinstatement, not 
monetary damages.114 As the Government pointed out in their amicus brief in Davila, both the 
Mertens and Great-West decisions involved claims against non-fiduciaries.115 In addition, the 
mixed decisions at issue in Pegram were also considered non-fiduciary acts.116 And finally, the 
Court again missed the opportunity to address damages against a fiduciary in Davila because the 
plaintiffs did not pursue any issues beyond complete preemption.117 Thus, whether trust law 
                                                 
113 Id. at 223 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28, 
n. 13).  
114 Varity, 516 U.S. 489. 
115 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 249; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221. 
116 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237. 
117 Davila, 542 U.S. at 221, n. 7. 
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remedies “typically available in equity,” such as make-whole compensatory relief, against a 
breaching fiduciary will pass Supreme Court muster under ERISA § 502(a)(3) remains uncertain. 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet precluded compensatory damages for individual 
plan beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty, Justice Scalia’s generally unwavering treatment 
confined strictly to language of § 502(a)(3) suggest it is inevitable, if he has anything to do with 
it. First, the Court set the stage in Russell by expressing its reluctance to “tamper” with a 
“comprehensive and reticulated” enforcement scheme so carefully crafted in ERISA.118 Not only 
that, but ERISA’s fiduciary liability provision and corresponding enforcement provision were 
intended to protect the plan as a whole, rather than the individual plan beneficiaries.119  
Second, the Scalia camp attributes its interpretation generally out of strict allegiance to 
clear congressional intent. In particular, as Justice Scalia aptly put it, “It is, however, not our job 
to find reasons for what Congress has plainly done; and it is our job to avoid rendering what 
Congress has plainly done (here, limit the available relief) devoid of reason and effect.”120 
Indeed, he insisted that if Congress had intended to authorize compensatory damages, it would 
have simply said so in the statute.121 Or, another example of the Court’s blind obedience is in 
part of Justice Stevens’s rationale for denying relief to a plan participant for detrimental delay in 
benefit claims processing—“the text of ERISA does not explicitly regulate ‘the possible 
consequences of delay in the plan administrators’ processing of a disputed claim.’ ”122 Although 
Justice Stevens since made an about face in his views, Justice Scalia was still convinced in 
Mertens that trust law would provide too broad of a range of remedies than Congress intended.123 
                                                 
118 Russell, 473 U.S. at 146–47; see also Pilot, 481 U.S. at 54. 
119 Russell, 473 U.S. at 142. 
120 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217–18. 
121 Id. at 218. One could also argue the opposite: that if Congress had intended such a narrow definition of “other 
appropriate equitable relief,” it would have expressly said so. 
122 Langbien, supra note 14, at 1328 (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 144). 
123 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257–58. 
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Hence, Justice Scalia’s side insists that Congress intended his narrow construction of § 
502(a)(3). 
Last, and more importantly, the Court’s insistence in Mertens that compensatory damages 
are not “appropriate equitable relief” as contained in ERISA § 502 in the non-fiduciary context 
will likely carry over to the fiduciary context.124 To be sure, Great-West seemed to reinforce that 
the Scalia Camp would not vary its interpretation of § 502 depending on the context, carving out 
one narrow exception—only “restitution traditionally available in equity,” not as legal relief. In 
other words, “for restitution to lie in equity,” the plaintiff cannot impose personal liability on the 
defendant, as it would be considered legal relief, except to recover identifiable money in the 
defendant’s possession that “in good conscience” belongs to the plaintiff.125 Interestingly, Justice 
Breyer’s Varity opinion indicated that § 502(a)(3) does cover breaches of fiduciary duty.126  
Nonetheless, weighing in on this issue in his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, writing 
for the Scalia camp, even stated that “§§ 409 and 502(a)(2) [ ] provide the exclusive mechanism 
for bringing claims of breach of fiduciary duty”—indicating rather clearly that he opposed 
individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty.127 And, hidden in a footnote at the end of the 
Great-West decision, Justice Scalia emphasized the limited spectrum of equitable remedies 
available under § 502(a)(3), even in the fiduciary context.128 Furthermore, even some lower 
                                                 
124 See Russell, 472 U.S. at 145 (holding that § 409 only authorizes extra-contractual damages to the plan itself, not 
to plan beneficiaries); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (limiting the scope of “other appropriate equitable relief” in § 
502(a)(3) to “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and 
restitution, but not compensatory damages)); Great-West 534 U.S. at 221 (holding that § 502(a)(3) does not 
authorize legal relief). "Almost invariably ... suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to 
compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for 'money damages,' as that phrase has 
traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach 
of legal duty." Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 918-919 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). And "[m]oney damages are, 
of course, the classic form of legal relief." Mertens, 208 U.S. at 255.  
125 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213–14. 
126 Varity, 516 U.S. at 510. 
127 Id. at 520 (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). 
128 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221, n.5 (clarifying its decision in Varity, 516 U.S. 489, a breach of fiduciary duty case 
where the Court allowed reinstatement as appropriate equitable relief under § 502(a)(3).) 
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courts have reasoned that “the status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or nonfiduciary, does 
not affect the question of whether damages constitute ‘appropriate equitable relief’ under § 
502(a)(3).”129 Indeed, Judge Newman of the Second Circuit summed it well, “Despite the sweep 
of the language from the Restatement supporting actions in equity against fiduciaries for breach 
of their duties . . . , I am persuaded that the Supreme Court's dictum in Great-West sends a signal 
that should not be ignored.”130 Therefore, it seems the fiduciary context would likely present a 
distinction without a difference for the Scalia camp in its narrow application of § 502(a)(3).  
On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Stevens’s camp would likely include make-
whole remedies under its broad interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” for breach of 
ERISA fiduciary duty. First and foremost, one of the primary purposes of ERISA was to protect 
the “interests of plan participants.”131 It is actually written into the text of the statute. From this 
and the fact that ERISA was originally conceived of from common law trust principles, it was 
obvious to the Stevens camp that Congress actually intended ERISA to provide a broad frame 
under which the courts could apply make-whole relief. Second, also written in the text are 
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty. After the Russell decision, the Court pointed out 
in Varity that § 502(l) of ERISA provides for payment of civil penalties by breaching fiduciaries 
to plan participants and beneficiaries, as well as the plan, for claims brought under § 502(a)(5), 
which is nearly identical to § 502(a)(3).132 So, contrary to its prior Russell opinion, ERISA does 
                                                 
129 Callery v. U.S. Life Insur. Co., 392 F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing McLeod v. OR Lithoprint, Inc., 102 
F.3d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Calhoon v. Trans World Airlines, 400 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
statutory language does not condition available remedies on the defendant's identity, but simply states that ‘a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary’ may bring a civil action ‘to obtain other appropriate equitable relief’ to enforce 
the act or the plan.”). 
130 Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 346 (2d Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., concurring). 
131 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2005). 
132 Varity, 516 U.S. at 510. But see Varity, 516 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., 
dissenting) (reasoning that § 502(l) is not an indication that Congress intended individual relief under § 502(a)(3) for 
breach of fiduciary duty because § 502(l) was enacted over a decade later); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 260–61 (indicating 
that § 502(l) penalties are only awarded when there has been a transfer to the plan of money or property). It should 
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not preclude individual recovery for breach of fiduciary duty. Third, as Justice Ginsburg has 
pointed out, the only cases claiming individual relief under § 502(a)(3) were against non-
fiduciaries.133 And fourth, restitution, like that the Scalia majority ruled as “appropriate” in both 
Mertens and Great-West, is a form of monetary relief in equity.134 Hence, the Stevens camp 
would likely support monetary damages under § 502(a)(3) for individual plan beneficiaries for 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
A. Uncertain Future in the Supreme Court 
The future of available “equitable” relief in the Supreme Court may seem a bit foggy. In 
fact, looking back at its major cases deciding the scope of § 502(a)(3), one can clearly see a tug-
of-war in the Court on the issue. On one end is Justice Scalia, the original magician that made 
long-abandoned definition of “equity” reappear. Joined by Justice Thomas, Scalia adopts a 
narrow interpretation of “appropriate equitable remedies.”135 And on the other end, other 
justices, like Justices Breyer and Stevens, maintain a broader definition based in trust 
principles.136 The other remaining justices, such as the classic swing-voters, Justices O’Connor 
and Kennedy, have played on both teams.137 Justice Stevens actually switched sides between the 
Russell and Mertens decision.138 Also, Mertens and Great-West were both narrow five-to-four 
                                                                                                                                                             
be noted that Varity was decided after Mertens, so the later ruling should stand. Mertens is based on a proposed 
regulation, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,288, 25,289, & n.9 (June 20, 1990). Even 
if an agency’s proposed regulation held any weight, it should not after the Varity decision. See Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005) (“A court's prior judicial construction of 
a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision 
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion.”). 
133 See Davila, 542 U.S. at 223 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) 
134 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215. 
135 See Mertens, 508 U.S. 248. 
136 See Varity, 516 U.S. 489. 
137 See id.; see also Mertens, 508 U.S. 248; Great-West, 534 U.S. 208. 
138 Russell, 473 U.S. 134; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 263 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and O’Connor, 
JJ., dissenting). 
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wins for the Scalia camp.139 Varity was a broader six-to-three victory for the Stevens camp.140 
And Davila, though unanimous, never addressed the issue of remedies.141 With two new justices 
joining the bench to replace two middle-ground justices, the former Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor, the future of this issue is uncertain.  
V. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: AND THE WINNER IS . . . 
Though the Court’s ultimate outcome in this tug-of-war over § 502(a)(3) “equitable” 
relief may seem uncertain, one thing is certain: Justice Stevens’s camp clearly has a more 
appropriate approach. Under his approach, courts should award ERISA plan participants at least 
make-whole compensatory damages for breach of fiduciary duty. First, ERISA expressly 
indicates one of its primary purposes—to impose duties on the plan fiduciaries to protect the 
individual plan participants and beneficiaries. Second, since ERISA was indisputably based on 
common law trust principles, it stands to reason that Congress intended the courts to apply those 
trust principles to ERISA claims, rather than Scalia’s abandoned principles from the divided 
bench. Indeed, Scalia would leave plan participants without any meaningful remedies, especially 
given the fact that ERISA preempts any claims related to benefit plans. Finally, when one puts 
all of the pieces together, this may not be the best approach to HMO fiduciary liability, to be 
honest, but it is the only approach that would make sense under ERISA as it now stands. 
ERISA’s far-reaching and complex impact on HMO liability is beyond anything Congress 
fathomed upon the statute’s creation, and therefore, deserves further consideration by Congress, 
its creator, not further creativity in the courts.  
This next section will discuss one of Justice Stevens’s strongest justifications, which is to 
support the purposes Congress expressly included in the statute. Then, in light of that, since 
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ERISA is founded in trust law, it is important to consider its application in the trust law context. 
A. Comprehensive Language 
Like most laws, ERISA was not created in a vacuum. Courts have other sources to help 
shed light on that troublesome little phrase “other appropriate equitable relief.” The Supreme 
Court basically debated whether Congress intended to base ERISA § 502(a)(3) remedies for 
breach of fiduciary duty on well-established trust law or on remedies available in equity during 
the obsolete practice of separate courts of law and of equity. Justice Stevens’s functionalist bloc 
relied on the overall purposes behind ERISA to support the former theory, whereas Justice 
Scalia’s literalist bloc supported the latter theory solely on a textual basis of one word in the 
statute: “equitable.” Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, emphasized in Varity, “We should 
expect that courts, in fashioning ‘appropriate’ equitable relief, will keep in mind the ‘special 
nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,’ and will respect the ‘policy choices reflected in 
the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others.’ ”142 Indeed, Justice Stevens did 
just that, finding ample support for his assertions, not only in the text of the statute, but also in 
the legislative history.  
As already mentioned, ERISA itself indicates it was intended to “provid[e] appropriate 
remedies” to its participants.143 The text of the statute contains the general purposes Congress 
intended it to promote—namely,  
"to protect . . . the interests of participants . . . and . . . beneficiaries . . . by 
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries . . . 
and . . . providing for appropriate remedies . . . and ready access to the Federal 
courts.”144  
 
What is more, ERISA fiduciaries are expected to act “solely in the interest of the participants and 
                                                 
142 Varity, 516 U.S. at 512 (citing Pilot., 481 U.S. at 54 and Russell, 473 U.S. at 147). 
143 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).  
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beneficiaries.”145  
Along with those direct statements, ERISA’s language also contains more subtle 
indications that Congress intended to enforce fiduciary obligations under ERISA. To begin with, 
comparing ERISA’s pension plan provisions to non-pension welfare benefit plans also suggests 
the concern Congress had in fiduciary regulation of ERISA plan administration. ERISA covers 
both pension plans and non-pension welfare benefit plans, which include medical, surgical, 
accident, and health programs. As for pension plans, Title I of ERISA provides strict rules in 
such areas as funding, vesting, an anti-cutback rule, plan termination insurance for the employer, 
and fiduciary duties in managing the plan benefits. In contrast, Congress excluded welfare 
benefit plans from these Title I rules with the notable exception of fiduciary duty in managing 
the plan benefits—a strong indication of the import fiduciary law holds in welfare benefit plan 
administration.146 Another subtle example of fiduciary enforcement is the aforementioned civil 
penalties in § 502(l), awarded to the plan and to participants for breach of fiduciary duty under § 
502(a)(2) and § 502(a)(5), which is nearly identical to § 502(a)(3).147  
Thus, even if the Court were to go strictly by the “comprehensive” language of the 
statute, it clearly would reach the same result as Justice Stevens’s camp did. Even the legislative 
history also indicates Congress intended to provide broad remedies for breach of fiduciary 
duty.148 Indeed, “[g]iven these objectives, it is hard to imagine why Congress would want to 
immunize breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries 
                                                 
145 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2005). 
146 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1323–24 (citing ERISA §§ 201(1), 301(a)(a), 4021(a)(1)). 
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a remedy.”149 
The Mertens majority, led by Justice Scalia, relied on the usage of both the terms 
“equitable” and “legal,” as well as “equitable” and “remedial” together, in a few other 
provisions of the statute as distinguishing factors.150 From that, Scalia somehow inferred 
§ 502(a)(3) to include only those remedies “typically available in equity” from the days 
of the divided bench.151 However, not only was this a practice long-retired from the court 
system, but also the dissent pointed out that those provisions it relied on made the 
distinction out of necessity because it had no trust law analogue to refer to.152 Hence, 
Scalia missed the mark by narrowly deciphering the word “equity” in the wrong context 
with the rest of the statute—failing to consider those purposes Congress actually wrote 
into the text of the statute.  
B. Trust Law Foundation 
Fiduciary duties have an undeniable foundation in trust law. For instance, the fiduciary 
duties described in ERISA, such as duty of loyalty,153 duty of prudence,154 and benefit 
determinations,155 obviously parallel trust law language.156 And, in the HMO context, the 
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155 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (requiring ERISA plans to follow written claims procedures for benefit denial, to give reasons 
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Supreme Court looked at plan benefits as a “medical trust.”157  
Although there is little doubt that ERISA was originally derived from trust law 
principles,158 there is some question as to what extent trust law is reflected in ERISA.159 Yet, 
another look at the Court’s own case law, the legislative history, and even the statute itself 
clearly provide the answer: courts should use trust common law—which is settled and 
contemporary—as the template to deciding the scope “appropriate equitable relief,” rather than 
referring to Scalia’s antiquated system. Put plainly in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the 
Court stated, “Given this language and history, we have held that courts are to develop a ‘federal 
common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.’ ”160 In this case, the Court 
applied trust law to fill in the blank for the appropriate standard to review denial of benefits, 
unanimously holding that de novo review was the appropriate standard.161 As Professor Langbein 
indicated in his landmark article, “The core fallacy of the majority opinion in Russell, which has 
carried over to Mertens and Great-West, is to confuse applying with implying.”162 In other 
words, Scalia’s camp mistakenly inferred that Congress intentionally omitted certain remedies 
from ERISA, rather than applying the trust law principles to fashion “appropriate equitable 
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161 489 U.S. 101, 111, 115 (1989). 
162 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1343. “Accordingly, interpreting Congress's term "appropriate equitable relief" to 
cover so predictable and recurrent a case as fiduciary breach resulting in consequential injury entails applying the 
cause of action Congress created, not implying a cause of action that Congress omitted.” Id. at 1344. 
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remedies,” as Congress intended. For instance, ERISA § 404(a) fiduciary duty description and 
the § 502(a)(3) “catchall” remedy provision were only generally described. And, as Professor 
Langbein pointed out, Congress also left out a statute of limitations, a jury trial requirement, a 
standard of review, when attorney fees are appropriate, and whether punitive damages are 
permissible.163 Indeed, “when enacting ERISA Congress was transposing the trust model into 
regulatory law for the newly federalized field of pension and employee benefit plans.”164  
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly indicated in the statute, trust common law should 
apply by default to develop “appropriate equitable relief” for breaches of fiduciary duty.165 Trust 
law traditionally provides “make-whole” relief in many instances. It stands to reason that such 
remedies could apply to ERISA fiduciary liability cases. Scalia even stated that “the meaning [of 
§502(a)(3) relief] remains a question of interpretation in each case which meaning is 
intended.”166 The make-whole standard, a “core principal” of trust remedy law, “restores the 
victim to the positions that he or she would have had ‘if there had been no breach of trust.’ ”167 
Trust law also allows for specific performance, restitution, and monetary damages.168 In fact, the 
Uniform Trust Code provides that “[t]o remedy a breach of trust . . . the court may . . . compel 
the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying money . . . .”169 Thus, trust law does include 
compensatory damages as an available equitable remedy.  
                                                 
163 Id. at 1344. The courts have addressed some of these issues and “filled in the blanks.” See, e.g., Firestone, 489 
U.S. at 108-09 (stating that courts have adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard of review); see also Russell, 
473 U.S. at 144 (holding that fiduciaries are not liable for punitive damages). 
164 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1343–44. 
165 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264–65 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) 
(citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110). 
166 Id. at 256–57. 
167 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1335 (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 237 (4th ed. 1988) (12 vols., 1987-1991)). 
168 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213 (“[A] plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a 
constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the 
plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's possession. See 1 D. DOBBS, LAW 
OF REMEDIES § 4.3(1), at 587-588 (2d ed. 1993); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160, Comment a, at 641–42 
(1936); 1 G. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.4, at 17; § 3.7, at 262 (1978)). 
169 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(b)(3) (amended 2001), 7C U.L.A. 221 (Supp. 2003). 
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Nevertheless, ignoring those aspects of the trust remedy law as “other appropriate 
equitable relief” under ERISA,170 Scalia’s nonsensical “categories of relief that were typically 
available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory 
damages)” effectively provide no relief at all to most victims wrongfully denied or delayed 
benefits by HMOs.171 And a “crime” (breach of fiduciary duty, in this case) with no punishment 
is no crime at all. 
What this really does, by including a cause of action in ERISA for breach of fiduciary 
duty that preempts other claims, yet denies individual relief, is create a vehicle for HMOs to 
defraud. With no enforceable liability outside of injunction and restitution, it provides further 
incentive for HMOs to deny or short-change medical coverage to ERISA plan participants—
legitimizing a practice HMOs are already quite fond of. One reason Scalia’s approach is 
attractive to HMOs is because the participants in the midst of medical crisis are generally in no 
position to appeal their beneficiary rights. Another reason is because, with only “equitable” 
consequences under ERISA, as interpreted by the courts, the most that could happen is the HMO 
would be forced to cover the medical treatment in question. Often by then, the plaintiff is seeking 
damages, not coverage, which are supposedly unavailable under ERISA’s § 502(a) civil 
enforcement provisions. Thus, one could say an HMO can literally get away with murder. 
One is left to wonder why Justice Scalia would limit thus “other appropriate equitable 
relief”—especially since most claims seeking payment to the plaintiff—whether by judgment, by 
declaration, or by injunction—are “[a]lmost invariably” for loss caused by defendant’s breach of 
legal duty, or legal damages.172 All that remains of “typically equitable” remedies after Great-
                                                 
170 See ERISA § 502(a)(3); see also Mertens, 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (identifying appropriate remedies for breach 
of trust as those "typically available at equity") (emphasis omitted).  
171 Id. at 256. 
172 Bowen, 487 U.S. 879, 918–919 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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West is “(1) injunction, for which Congress did not need to provide ‘other appropriate equitable 
relief’ in [§] 502(a)(3), having already expressly authorized injunction earlier in the same 
sentence; and (2) restitution for cases that might have been brought as constructive trust actions 
before fusion.”173 Indeed, Professor Langbein was puzzled at why the drafters would hide the 
ball by calling it “other appropriate equitable relief,” if what they had really intended was just a 
constructive trust.174  
Justice Scalia’s response: ERISA § 502(a) was intended to protect the plan, not the plan 
beneficiaries. His reasoning referred back to Justice Stevens’s concept of a comprehensive 
enforcement scheme in his Russell decision. Since §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) were the only places 
that expressly addressed breaches of fiduciary duty, then that was the only way Congress 
intended the courts to approach the issue.175 And, from the Russell decision, those sections will 
not provide individual relief for breaches of fiduciary duty. In addition, in a further effort to 
protect plan assets, he rejected the application of current trust law principles as too expansive 
(and expensive).176 With nothing else to turn to—no legislative history, no case law, not even the 
trust law ERISA was based on—Justice Scalia unearthed ancient principles from the obsolete 
practice of a divided bench to reach a narrow definition of “equitable” that would favor 
protection to ERISA plans. In effect, Scalia’s strict textual approach was actually more of a 
stretch—rejecting the “vague notion” of protecting plan beneficiaries for protection of the plan 
assets themselves.177 In opposition to Justice Scalia’s baseless inferences, Justice Stevens stated 
                                                 
173 Langbein, supra note 14 , at 1360. 
174 Id. 
175 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221, n.5. 
176 However, it is worth noting that restitution, like that upheld in Mertens, is based in trust law, further implicating 
the weakness of his stance against the application of trust law. 508 U.S. at 256. In Great-West Justice Scalia tried to 
cover his oversight by distinguishing restitution in equity from that in law. 534 U.S. at 213.  
177 Varity, 516 U.S. at 538–39 (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (“Although Congress 
sought to guarantee that employees receive the welfare benefits promised by employers, Congress was also aware 
that if the cost of providing welfare benefits rose too high, employers would not provide them at all.”); see also 
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appropriately,  
The Court is no doubt correct that “vague notions of a statute's ‘basic purpose’ are 
. . . inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under 
consideration.” But when Congress' clearly stated purpose so starkly conflicts 
with questionable inferences drawn from a single word in the statute, it is the 
latter, and not the former, that must give way.178 
 
However, with the recent emergence of HMOs, the vast intricacies of HMO 
administration, and the fact that the stakes are much higher when dealing with people’s health, 
then this perhaps elevates HMOs to a higher level than ordinary ERISA fiduciaries. Thus, 
ERISA’s application to HMO plans deserves a closer look. 
C. HMO Considerations 
Despite Justice Scalia’s questionable justification behind his narrow definition of equity, 
his theory may have some redeeming qualities in the context of emerging HMO liability issues. 
Some would argue that shifting focus of fiduciary duty of loyalty from the plan to individual plan 
beneficiaries would inevitably lead to costly consequences and confusion. In fact, Justice Scalia 
has mentioned increasing liability may induce higher costs, discouraging employers from 
offering private benefit plans.179 Furthermore, as illustrated by the amici cited in Varity, plan 
administrative decisions will favor payment to the beneficiaries over preserving plan assets, 
hiking costs for ERISA plans.180 Non-expert courts may place plan administrators’ “technical 
decisions” under the microscope for closer supervision.181 And, plaintiffs may cloak their 
ordinary benefit claims as fiduciary duty claims.182 Thus, some, including Justice Scalia, reason 
that Congress must have intended this restrictive remedial scheme for ERISA HMO plans.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (“Exposure to that sort of liability would impose high insurance costs upon persons who 
regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans themselves.”) 
178 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 228–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261) (emphasis deleted). 
179 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 538–39 (Thomas, J., joined by O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). 
180 Id. at 513–15. 
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
 32
However, this is all speculative, especially in the HMO context. In fact, none of these 
arguments were made in terms of HMOs and the climbing medical costs that burden this country 
today. Without any support of this theory precipitated anywhere, such as in the legislative 
history, this theory does not hold much weight to justify how Congress intended to apply 
ERISA’s § 502 remedial scheme in HMO liability claims relating to employee benefit plans. 
Because HMOs, in the form they exist today, did not dominate the health care industry at the 
time ERISA was created, Congress could not have anticipated the extent of the effects of HMO 
liability under ERISA benefit plan regulation. What ERISA’s legislative history does 
demonstrate is that Congress intended to word the statute broadly (“other appropriate equitable 
relief”) in order to provide flexibility in employment benefit plan regulation, thereby leaving the 
federal courts to “fine-tune ERISA’s remedial scheme” based on trust common law tradition.183 
Or, as Professor Langbein summarized Justice Stevens’s approach: 
To expect express statutory regulation in ERISA concerning such details of sound 
fiduciary practice misconceives how Congress constructed ERISA. What 
Congress did in ERISA was (1) to mandate the trust device for all plan assets; (2) 
to make every person an ERISA fiduciary who exercises any discretion over plan 
assets or plan administration; and (3) to prescribe the core principles of trust 
fiduciary law, loyalty and prudence, to govern all aspects of plan administration. 
In consequence, Congress had no need to spell out the details, and considerable 
reason not to do so when legislating for a new field whose contours were not yet 
fully known.184 
 
Though Justice Stevens’s camp should have the winning approach, it is simply not 
enough. The HMO liability problem is much bigger than could be adequately covered by ERISA 
as it now stands. To begin with, lumping HMOs into ERISA regulation has resulted in a 
                                                 
183 Russell, 473 U.S. at 152–53 n.6, 155, 157 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing several references in the legislative 
history indicating a clear intent to extend trust fiduciary principles to employee benefit plans). For example, Senator 
Jacob Jarvis, one of the principle authors of ERISA, reported to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
that "[i]t is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues 
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Id. at 156 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 
(1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)). But see infra note 118 and accompanying text.  
184 Langbein, supra note 14, at 1325–29 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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regulatory vacuum that needs to be addressed. Injured plan participants have no effective relief, 
under Justice Scalia’s approach to ERISA’s remedial scheme. Along with that are complex cost 
issues, such as how to balance the costs of providing benefits to plan participants, as Justice 
Stevens would suggest, with avoiding higher plan costs that may result from increased HMO 
liability, as Justice Scalia would suggest. Also, as demonstrated by the Pegram and Davila cases, 
ERISA fiduciary duty is not always so black and white in HMO benefit administration.185 
Eligibility decisions are inescapably steeped in medical treatment considerations, implying a 
more complex set of standards than ERISA “comprehensive and reticulated scheme” envisioned. 
Thus, the many judges who have spoken out have the right idea, though they feel bound by 
Mertens, by invoking Congress or the high courts to reconsider § 502(a) in response to 
“regulatory vacuum” that has resulted.186 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Had Juan Davila actually claimed § 502(a)(3) remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, 
instead of limiting himself to appealing the lower court’s decision for ERISA preemption of his 
state law claims, the viability of Justice Ginsburg’s loophole would no longer be a mystery. 
Perhaps Davila’s attorneys had too much faith in his preemption appeal alone. Or, perhaps they 
had no faith in obtaining relief under § 502(a)(3) in Davila’s case. Thus far, lower federal courts 
generally do not grant such relief after the Supreme Court’s Mertens decision. However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court is actually split over the matter. If the Court were to rule in accordance with the 
purposes ERISA was intended to fulfill, the success of his claim would be certain.  
According to Justice Stevens’s functionalist camp, an increasing problem where 
                                                 
185 Pegram, 530 U.S. 211; Davila, 542 U.S. 200. “[W]hen an HMO guarantees medically necessary care, 
determinations of coverage in an emergency situation ‘cannot be untangled from physicians' judgments about 
reasonable medical treatment.’ ” Rush, 536 U.S. at 383 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229). 
186 Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 456). 
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employers were defaulting on their private pension payments led Congress to enact ERISA to 
protect the employee plan participants and to provide uniformity in the regulation of employee 
pension and welfare benefits plans. ERISA was based on the idea that the plan benefits are being 
held in trust for the employees. As such, Congress based much of ERISA on common law trust 
principles. However, with this being a new area of law, it provided a basic structure, with the 
expectation that the courts would use trust common law to develop their own “federal common 
law” for ERISA.187  
Unfortunately, the more formalist camp of the Court, led by Justice Scalia, took a 
different approach. Scalia believed that ERISA has a “comprehensive” remedial scheme that 
should be applied only to protect the plan itself, not the employee participants. From that, he 
inferred § 502(a)(3) “other appropriate equitable relief” to encompass only “those categories of 
relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but 
not compensatory damages).”188  
Although perhaps Scalia had worthy intentions of controlling increased costs that may 
arise from allowing individual relief under § 502(a)(3) for breaches of fiduciary duty, Congress 
did not share the same sentiment. In fact, with very tenuous support for his position, he rejected 
ample legislative history, case law, trust law principles, and even express relevant text of ERISA 
that overwhelmingly supported the application of make-whole compensatory remedies as 
                                                 
187 “I believe that, in resolving this and other questions concerning appropriate relief under ERISA, courts should 
begin by ascertaining the extent to which trust and pension law as developed by state and federal courts provide for 
recovery by the beneficiary above and beyond the benefits that have been withheld; this is the logical first step, 
given that Congress intended to incorporate trust law into ERISA's equitable remedies. If a requested form of 
additional relief is available under state trust law, courts should next consider whether allowance of such relief 
would significantly conflict with some other aspect of the ERISA scheme.  In addition, courts must always bear in 
mind the ultimate consideration whether allowance or disallowance of particular relief would best effectuate the 
underlying purposes of ERISA--enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in the administration of all aspects 
of pension plans and promotion of the best interests of participants and beneficiaries.” Russell, 473 U.S. at 157–58 
(Brennan, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
188 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256. 
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“appropriate equitable relief.” In fact, what he said is that ERISA provides a cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty and even has exclusive jurisdiction of related claims, but his narrow 
interpretation of § 502(a)(3) provides no compensatory relief to those injured individual 
plaintiffs. Of course, this sort of “immunity” encourages HMOs to deny coverage to plan 
participants.  
The truth is that, although Justice Stevens’s trust law approach is the most appropriate 
approach under ERISA as it now stands, it is not the best approach to HMO liability. The HMO 
problem simply has too many pieces to fit into the ERISA mold Congress has provided. It 
certainly is no wonder, since HMOs did not exist in their present form at the time of ERISA’s 
conception. Therefore, though the Court is now caught in a tug-of-war, with very polarized 
views of how to approach the problem, there is no question that what HMO liability needs is not 
judicial creativity, but careful congressional consideration and action. 
